The NYPD’s principal “person of interest” in the assassination of UnitedHealthcare CEO Brian Thompson arrived in Manhattan late last month after a long bus ride from Atlanta — then stayed at a hostel ahead of Tuesday’s shocking act, law enforcement sources tell various outlets. Many more details are piling up — from the remarkable weapon cops think he used to the type of pricey backpack he seems to have ditched in Central Park — but there’s still no name to go with the smiling face captured by the hostel’s front-desk security camera.  

Police say the man arrived in New York City on Nov. 24 — the Sunday before Thanksgiving — stepping off a Greyhound bus at the Port Authority bus terminal in Manhattan around 9pm. That particular bus route originates in Atlanta. Some reports say police don’t yet know where he boarded the coach, while others indicate investigators believe he was aboard from the start of the nearly 900-mile journey from Atlanta to New York, which can take 20 hours or more on Greyhound.  

Police sources say he then checked into the HI New York City Hostel  at Amsterdam Avenue and West 103rd Street, on the Upper West Side near Central Park. The revelation of his face appears to have come during a flirtatious moment of weakness as he interacted with a woman working the hostel’s front desk, lowering his mask to beam at her across the desk. The suspect left the hostel on Friday, Nov. 29, only to return via Uber to check back in the very next day.  

He reportedly used a bogus New Jersey driver’s license to book his stays at the hostel, where he roomed with two apparent strangers. “That’s not clever, because there is recording, video all over the place,” John Nielsen, a visitor from Denmark who’s been staying at the hostel for the past week, told the Times.  

Police have taken keen interest in a gun sale in Connecticut — involving a highly-uncommon weapon that appears similar to the one seen in the video of the killing. “It’s a covert-type weapon. It is not sold widely,” said CBS News law enforcement contributor Rich Esposito. “They’ll go to the dealers of that gun and try to establish if they know who this person is.” 

According to CBS News, police believe the murder weapon is a B&T Station SIX-9, which comes equipped with a sound-suppressor and retails for around $2,100. Note carefully how B&T describes its latest version: 

This updated, integrally suppressed pistol features a new grip and updated magazines, yet maintains its non-descript appearance, whisper-quiet sound signature and unique rotating bolt operation. This model in 9mm wears a 3-in. barrel. It finds its operational success as a magazine-fed, non-auto-ejecting single-shot functioning in a rotational bolt action. It is beautifully enhanced by wipe suppressor, and a baffled suppressor is an available option for those who prefer that design. 

🚨𝕏 WARNING – GRAPHIC VIDEO 𝕏🚨

🚨BREAKING: Footage of Killer Gunning down CEO of UnitedHealthcare! Looks like the gun got jammed but then he re-unloads on him. Do you think this was a trained marksmen or random? pic.twitter.com/202ls9L3lv

— Professor Nez (@professornez) December 4, 2024

The “non-auto-ejecting single-shot functioning” is consistent with what’s seen in the video of the shooting, as the assassin manipulates the pistol after firing each shot — something that both casual observers and experts had widely attributed to the pistol malfunctioning. Here’s how the operation of the Station SIX looks with the 45-caliber version: 

It’s the B&T Station Six 9mm pic.twitter.com/gWoX7nFlxv

— Maxwell Little, M.Ed 🇺🇸 (@MaxHPF) December 5, 2024

The suspect shot the 50-year-old Thompson — who was arriving at the New York Hilton Midtown for an investors’ meeting at 6:45 am — in the back and leg before leaving first by foot, then using an e-bike that he rode through Central Park. Police think he exited the park at West 77th Street — minus the backpack he wore during the killing and as he rolled into the park.

Some internet sleuths think they’ve figured out the make and model of that backpack — concluding it’s an Everyday Backpack sold by Peak Designs between 2016 and 2019, TMZ reports. It’s not cheap: Marketed for use by photographers but also used by others, the latest version goes for about $250.  

Investigators recovered 9mm shell casings and live rounds at the shooting that were adorned with the words “deny,” “defend” and “depose,” written carefully with a sharpie. Those words are open to interpretation, but many are pointing to their similarity to the title of Jay Feinman’s book, “Delay Deny Defend: Why Insurance Companies Don’t Pay Claims And What You Can Do About It.” Given that, police are looking for people who may have reason for outrage at an individual coverage decision rendered by the health insurance giant. That could be quite a long list of people: Recent data from Lending Tree shows UnitedHealthcare has some of the highest claim denial rates of any US insurance company —  a jarring 32% compared to 17% for Blue Cross Blue Shield. (They may also want to talk to former Washington Post writer Taylor Lorenz.) 

There are many more clues undergoing intense police scrutiny. Less than a half-hour before murdering Thompson, the suspect used cash to buy drinks and snacks at a Starbucks near the ambush site. Police think they’ve obtained a water bottle and candy wrapper he left at the store, along with a coffee cup he may have drank from. They also found a cell phone in the alleyway that comprised part of his getaway route — a route that, at least this far along, has proven quite effective. 

However, his flirty smile at a female hostel clerk and choice of a highly uncommon pistol may prove to be his undoing… 

Authored by Carlo J.V.Caro via RealClearWire.com,

How China’s Control of Undersea Cables and Data Flows Reshapes Global Power

Cable Routing Protocols

The rapid construction of undersea cables has brought a hidden but crucial issue into focus: the manipulation of the protocols that control how data travels beneath the sea. These protocols determine the pathways internet data takes, influencing speed, costs, and even exposure to surveillance. Even small changes in these pathways can tilt the global balance of digital power. China’s increasing role in this area demonstrates how technology can be used strategically to reshape geopolitics.

At the heart of this issue is a technology called Software-Defined Networking (SDN). SDN allows data traffic to be managed and optimized in real time, improving efficiency. But this same flexibility makes SDN vulnerable to misuse. Chinese tech companies like HMN Tech (formerly Huawei Marine Networks), ZTE, and China Unicom are leading the way in SDN development. China also holds sway in international organizations that set the rules for these technologies, such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). This influence gives China a hand in shaping global standards and governance.

Africa illustrates how this influence plays out. Chinese investments in digital infrastructure across the continent are massive. For example, the PEACE (Pakistan and East Africa Connecting Europe) cable, which links East Africa to Europe, was designed to avoid Chinese territory. Yet, thanks to SDN technology, its traffic can still be redirected through Chinese-controlled points. This redirection could introduce delays of 20 to 30 milliseconds per hop—not much for casual browsing, but a serious issue for latency-sensitive activities like financial trading or encrypted communication.

In Southeast Asia, similar risks are evident. The Southeast Asia-Japan Cable (SJC), which connects Singapore to Japan, relies on several landing stations influenced by China. During a period of heightened tensions in the South China Sea, some data intended for Japan was mysteriously routed through Hainan Island, under Chinese jurisdiction. Such cases suggest technical routing decisions may sometimes have political motivations.

These examples are part of a broader strategy. By exploiting SDN, China can turn submarine cables into tools for surveillance and control. Data traffic from Africa or Southeast Asia destined for Europe could be secretly rerouted through Shanghai or Guangzhou, exposing it to China’s advanced surveillance techniques like deep packet inspection. This threat extends to cloud computing, as major providers such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Microsoft Azure, and Alibaba Cloud rely on undersea cables. With SDN, Chinese cloud providers—aligned with state interests—could redirect sensitive inter-cloud traffic, putting critical communications at risk.

Manipulating global data routes gives any actor significant geopolitical power. For instance, in a crisis, China could degrade or even sever internet connectivity for rival nations. In the Taiwan Strait, this could isolate Taiwan from global markets, disrupting financial transactions and trade. In Africa, where Huawei has built a significant portion of the continent’s telecommunications infrastructure—reportedly constructing around 70 percent of 4G networks—there is concern that this reliance could create vulnerabilities. If political tensions were to arise, China could cause slowdowns or disruptions to reinforce dependence, making countries more vulnerable in political standoffs.

The numbers highlight the stakes. Submarine cables carry 99 percent of international data traffic—over 1.1 zettabytes annually. Significant portions of intra-Asia-Pacific data flows pass through key submarine cable landing stations, including Hong Kong, which is under Chinese jurisdiction. With Chinese firms increasingly involved in substantial global submarine cable projects—such as those undertaken by HMN Technologies—Beijing’s influence over the internet’s physical backbone is growing.

The economic impact of internet disruptions on highly connected economies is substantial. For instance, the NetBlocks Cost of Shutdown Tool (COST) estimates the economic impact of internet disruptions using indicators from the World Bank, ITU, Eurostat, and the U.S. Census. According to data presented by Atlas VPN, based on NetBlocks’ COST tool, a global internet shutdown for one day could result in losses of about $43 billion, with the United States and China accounting for nearly half of this sum. Additionally, Deloitte has estimated that for a highly internet-connected country, the per-day impact of a temporary internet shutdown would be on average $23.6 million per 10 million population.

A deliberate attack on routing protocols could cause widespread financial and operational chaos. In today’s interconnected world, where digital infrastructure underpins economic stability, the ability to manipulate undersea cable traffic represents a subtle but powerful geopolitical weapon.

Addressing this threat goes beyond simply building more cables. It requires rethinking how routing protocols are governed. Transparent global standards must ensure no single country or company can dominate these systems. Routine independent audits should be conducted to detect anomalies that may signal interference. Efforts like the European Union’s Global Gateway initiative and Japan’s Digital Partnership Fund must focus on creating alternative routes to reduce reliance on Chinese-controlled nodes.

This issue highlights a new reality in global politics: control over data flows is becoming a key form of power. While most attention has been on building physical infrastructure, the quiet manipulation of routing protocols marks an equally profound shift in global influence. To protect the integrity of the internet, the world must act decisively at both technical and governance levels.

Fiber-Optic Cable Repair Networks

China’s disproportionate control over fiber-optic cable repair networks reveals potential vectors for intelligence dominance, coercive leverage, and disruption of digital sovereignty. Globally, an estimated 60 dedicated cable repair ships service the planet’s 1.5 million kilometers of submarine cables. China controls a substantial percentage of the fleet, including ships operated by state-affiliated enterprises like Shanghai Salvage Company and China Communications Construction Group. In contrast, the United States and its allies maintain a small patchwork fleet, mostly concentrated in the North Atlantic and lacking coverage in the Indo-Pacific, where over 50 percent of global internet traffic routes through key subsea cables.

China’s fleet is heavily concentrated in the South and East China Seas, regions critical to global connectivity due to chokepoints like the Singapore Strait and the Luzon Strait. With maritime exclusivity bolstered by China’s claims in disputed waters, its repair ships have nearly unrestricted access to monitor, repair, or potentially tamper with cables under the guise of routine maintenance.

Repair missions involve exposing critical cable infrastructure, including repeaters, amplifiers, and branch units—hardware that boosts signal strength over long distances but also represents points of vulnerability. Chinese vessels are equipped with advanced robotic submersibles and precision cutting-and-splicing technologies, designed for repairs but capable of installing signal interception devices. Such tools could include optical fiber taps capable of harvesting unencrypted metadata or capturing latency patterns to infer sensitive traffic flow.

China’s advancements in photonics and quantum communication technologies underscore its capacity to exploit these vulnerabilities. The Chinese Academy of Sciences has reported significant breakthroughs in quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, raising the possibility of developing quantum-based methods to crack encrypted data intercepted during repairs. Integration of AI-driven data sorting tools could automate the extraction and classification of intercepted information, rendering bulk data acquisition during repairs a strategic advantage.

The high seas, where many repair operations occur, are governed by fragmented international frameworks like the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which inadequately regulate activities involving critical infrastructure. The International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) provides voluntary guidelines for repair operations, but enforcement mechanisms are weak, leaving the system vulnerable to exploitation by state actors.

Repair missions are often classified as “emergency operations,” requiring expedited approvals that bypass detailed oversight. In one case, a cable break in the South China Sea in 2021 prompted Chinese repair ships to operate without transparency for over three weeks, raising concerns about potential covert activities. These incidents are rarely reported, as they fall outside the jurisdiction of most maritime monitoring bodies.

The lack of countermeasures by the United States and its allies amplifies the risks posed by China’s dominance. The U.S. Navy operates no specialized repair ships, relying on private operators like Global Marine Group, whose fleet is aging and ill-equipped for operations in contested waters. This contrasts with China’s state-backed model, integrating its repair fleet into broader maritime networks, providing dual-use functionality for civilian and military objectives.

The financial model of undersea cable operations further constrains Western responses. Submarine cables are predominantly privately owned, with firms like Google, Meta, and Amazon investing heavily in infrastructure but lacking incentives to prioritize geopolitical considerations. This privatization leaves strategic gaps in surveillance and monitoring, as governments must negotiate access to privately controlled repair missions.

To mitigate China’s strategic advantage, a multipronged response is essential. The United States and its allies must develop state-owned or state-subsidized repair fleets to operate in contested regions like the South China Sea and Indian Ocean. Enhanced maritime surveillance systems, such as underwater drones and sonar-based monitoring arrays, should be deployed to track repair ship movements in real time.

Revising international frameworks by expanding ICPC mandates to include mandatory reporting of repair operations could curb opacity. Collaboration with regional partners, particularly nations in the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States), could bolster collective maritime domain awareness and create redundancies in cable repair capabilities.

Maritime Data Through Automated Vessel Tracking

China’s exploitation of automated vessel tracking systems exemplifies a sophisticated component of its global digital strategy. At the heart of this initiative lies the Automatic Identification System (AIS), a maritime safety technology mandated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) for vessels exceeding 300 gross tons engaged in international trade. While originally intended to improve navigational safety by broadcasting vessel identities, locations, courses, and cargo details, AIS has been effectively repurposed by Beijing into a dual-use asset that supports both economic intelligence gathering and military surveillance.

Chinese firms, including the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System and Alibaba Cloud, have developed advanced platforms that aggregate AIS transmissions from shipping lanes worldwide. These platforms integrate AIS data with artificial intelligence-driven predictive analytics, enabling Beijing to monitor and analyze global maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca, the Panama Canal, and the Suez Canal—key arteries of international commerce. By doing so, China gains critical insights into global shipping patterns, strategic trade routes, and supply chain dynamics. As of 2023, the global merchant fleet comprised around 60,000 ships.

During the 2021 Suez Canal blockage, Chinese logistics firms, leveraging real-time AIS data, rapidly identified alternative routes through the Arctic and along the Indian Ocean, allowing Chinese exporters to reroute goods while Western competitors faced delays. Similarly, in the Strait of Malacca, a waterway facilitating the transit of over 16 million barrels of oil daily and 40 percent of global trade, Chinese analysts have used AIS data to optimize resource flow, preempt congestion, and study vulnerabilities in energy supply routes.

AIS data plays a pivotal role in China’s military strategy, especially in the Indo-Pacific. By combining AIS information with satellite imagery and data from undersea acoustic arrays, China has established a surveillance network capable of tracking naval deployments with precision. AIS data has been used to monitor patrol patterns of the U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet, revealing that over a third of its South China Sea operations in 2022 followed predictable routes. This surveillance allows the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to anticipate U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) and position its assets accordingly.

China’s manipulation of AIS extends to conflict simulations and asymmetric warfare. During military exercises near Taiwan in 2023, Chinese forces reportedly deployed unmanned surface vessels programmed to mimic civilian AIS signals, complicating the identification of hostile assets.

Through its Digital Silk Road initiative, Beijing has exported various forms of maritime technologies that incorporate Automatic Identification System (AIS) capabilities. China often provides financial incentives to promote the adoption of its technologies abroad, which may enhance its access to regional maritime data. This asymmetry grants China an informational advantage and risks reshaping maritime transparency norms in its favor.

Rare Subsea Mapping Data

China’s increasing investment in subsea mapping has positioned it as a significant player in oceanographic intelligence, impacting scientific, commercial, and military domains. China has been actively mapping its claimed maritime territories using state-funded research vessels and autonomous systems. These efforts contribute to international initiatives like the Nippon Foundation-GEBCO Seabed 2030 project, which aims to map the entire global seabed by 2030 and had mapped approximately 23.4 percent as of June 2022 with international contributions. China’s activities extend to strategic regions in the Indo-Pacific, the Arctic, and the Indian Ocean, raising concerns over the dual-use potential of its data collection.

Subsea mapping data is critical for submarine cable routing, undersea infrastructure development, and naval operations. China’s repository of high-resolution bathymetric maps—including surveys of key chokepoints like the Strait of Malacca and the Bashi Channel—provides a tactical edge. These chokepoints are vital for global trade and serve as strategic naval passages for power projection and anti-access/area-denial operations. The People’s Liberation Army Navy uses seabed data to optimize the placement of undersea sensor arrays, critical for its “Great Underwater Wall” initiative, integrating hydroacoustic monitoring to detect foreign submarines.

China’s advancements in autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) enhance its capabilities. In 2021, the Hailong III and Qianlong II AUVs were deployed for deep-sea mapping missions in the South China Sea, gathering data at depths over 6,000 meters. These AUVs have multi-beam sonar systems achieving sub-meter resolution, surpassing commercial standards. Their ability to operate autonomously over long durations allows China to map intricate undersea topographies critical for resource exploration and undersea warfare.

China has used seabed mapping as a diplomatic tool to extend influence over smaller nations. Through its Maritime Silk Road Initiative, Beijing has signed agreements with over 20 countries, granting Chinese research vessels access to Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). Between 2015 and 2022, Chinese expeditions in Pacific Island nations’ EEZs often involved dual-use mapping activities.

In 2019, the Chinese survey vessel Haiyang Dizhi 8 conducted seismic surveys near the Vanguard Bank within Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), collecting bathymetric data that aligns with key undersea routes potentially useful for submarine operations. This incursion led to a tense standoff with Vietnam, drawing international criticism over China’s assertive actions and raising concerns about the dual-use potential of the data collected. Similarly, in 2018, China’s proposed involvement in undersea cable projects connecting Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands through Huawei Marine raised significant security concerns. Fearing risks to the security of undersea communication cables and potential espionage, Australia intervened by funding and undertaking the projects themselves, highlighting apprehensions about granting Chinese entities access to critical seafloor data in the region.

China’s seabed mapping strategy has significant military implications, particularly in the South China Sea. In this region, where China has constructed artificial islands such as Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef, high-resolution seabed data enables precise deployment of missile systems, naval patrols, and underwater drones. Detailed seabed mapping supports the construction and fortification of these islands, allowing for the installation of surface-to-air missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, and the operation of military airstrips. Additionally, China’s deployment of unmanned underwater vehicles like the Sea Wing (Haiyi) gliders enhances their ability to collect oceanographic data crucial for submarine navigation and anti-submarine warfare. These activities have raised concerns among neighboring countries and the international community about the dual-use potential of China’s maritime endeavors and their impact on regional security.

By controlling seabed mapping data, China influences submarine cable networks, which carry 95 percent of global internet traffic and $10 trillion in daily financial transactions. China’s involvement in projects like the South Pacific Cable Project through state-owned China Mobile led to concerns over data interception capabilities. Its presence in Arctic seabed mapping, facilitated by icebreaker vessels like Xuelong 2, underscores ambitions to secure alternative maritime routes and resources under the guise of scientific research.

China’s approach to subsea mapping data has raised concerns about transparency and shared access in the global community. While international initiatives like the Seabed 2030 Project encourage open sharing of ocean floor data to advance scientific research and environmental understanding, China has been criticized for not fully sharing the extensive seabed data it collects. For example, much of the data gathered by Chinese vessels in international waters is not readily available in global databases like those managed by the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) or the General Bathymetric Chart of the Oceans (GEBCO). This selective sharing limits other nations’ ability to leverage valuable information and contrasts with global norms promoting cooperation and transparency in oceanographic research.

Behold – the American dream.

Where a fair and equal society allows anyone the ability to fashion the life they want, providing they’re willing to work for it.

A cornerstone of that dream is that each generation does better than the last, building and benefiting from growing economic opportunities.

But this does not necessarily hold true for all Americans.

This chart, via Visual Capitalist’s Pallavi Rao, compares the real household income of 27-year-olds from two generations: those born in 1978 and those born in 1992, both raised by low-income parents. All figures are in 2023 dollars.

ℹ️ 27 is the earliest age at which estimates of adult incomes can be measured. Only the 50 largest metros were considered in this analysis. Low-income is categorized by percentile groups.

A positive percentage change implies economic mobility, allowing us to see the cities where adults had a chance to better their circumstances, and to what extent.

Data is sourced from a study conducted by Opportunity Atlas in partnership with the Census Bureau.

Where is the American Dream Still Alive?

Southern cities in Texas, Tennessee, and North Carolina did see upward mobility between generations in the lowest income group, with real wages improving 5-7%.

For example, in Brownsville, Texas, those born to low-income parents in 1992 earned an average of $33,000 at age 27. This is around $2,000 more than their 1978-born peers at the same age, the highest increase across all 50 metro areas.

In contrast, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, saw real incomes decline across generations. The 1978 cohort earned a similar salary to their peers in Brownsville ($31,200), but a generation later, incomes dropped to $27,200.

In fact, only 12 of the 50 saw real income growth across generations for this economic class. And five of them were in Texas. This means that in 38 cities real wages fell between generations.

Zooming out, the average household income at 27 across the nation (for those born to low-income parents) dropped by 4%.

This class difference is important. Because when looking at the highest income percentile, the average income between generations increased 5%.

Wondering where wages adjusted for the cost of living are the highest in the country? Check out Mapped: Median Income by State for a quick overview.