Authored by Simon Watkins via OilPrice.com,

• Trump plans to prioritize increasing U.S. oil and gas production by removing federal drilling restrictions, which could lead to lower energy prices.

• Trump may look to negotiate an end to the Russia-Ukraine war with a settlement that secures disputed regions for Russia.

• Trump is likely to support Israel in taking action against Iran’s nuclear program, aiming to strengthen U.S.-Middle East alliances and counter China’s influence in the region.

Crucially for President-Elect Donald Trump’s second term in office, he will have considerable personal influence over the Senate (in which his Republican Party now holds a majority), and over the Supreme Court (where conservatives hold a six-to-three majority). His Party – and few can argue that it is now truly that – has also now secured a majority in the second of the two institutions of Congress, the House of Representatives, giving the re-elected President will have a once-in-a-lifetime chance to push through whatever legislation he wants, especially in the traditional honeymoon period of the first 100 days in office.

Three areas that he is likely to address in this period will have enormous ramifications for the global energy sector and the key countries that constitute its core.

One of these areas will be moves to increase the U.S.’s oil and gas production, as stated in several of Trump’s campaign speeches and documented in his ‘Trump Agenda47’.

Broadly, he will, “…set a national goal of ensuring that America has the No. 1 lowest cost of energy of any industrial country anywhere on Earth”. He added that to “keep pace with the world economy that depends on fossil fuels for more than 80 percent of its energy, President Trump will DRILL, BABY, DRILL”. He also highlights that he will, “end Biden’s delays in federal drilling permits and leases that are needed to unleash American oil and natural gas production”. This is likely to include the removal of much of the previous Presidential Administration’s pausing of key liquefied natural gas export permits. The likely net effect of this on oil and gas prices will clearly be bearish.

Another move Trump is likely to make in the first 100 days will be pushing for a negotiated settlement in the Russia-Ukraine War.

During his campaigning, the President-Elect repeatedly stated that he could end the war “in 24 hours” based on two key dealmaking tactics delineated in an interview with Fox News in July 2023. First, he would tell Russian President Vladimir Putin that if he did not make a deal with Ukraine then the U.S. would dramatically increase the scale and scope of its aid to the war-torn country. As a senior global security source who worked closely with Trump’s first Presidential Administration exclusively told OilPrice.com last week, this would include long-range sophisticated missiles being given to Kyiv and the permission to use them deep inside Russian territory that was ‘active’ in its war against Ukraine. Second, he would tell Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy that the U.S. would withhold all aid to it unless Kyiv negotiated a deal with Moscow. The starting point for the deal itself that Trump has in mind, according to the source, is one in which Russia retains the original disputed territories of Luhansk and Donetsk, in addition to keeping Crimea which was annexed during the 2014 invasion. The other major territories in the southeast – Kherson and Zaporizhzhia – plus other areas in the northeast occupied by Russian forces, would form part of a demilitarised zone between the two nations.

Trump can see an additional benefit in this plan, which is based on the premise of countries ultimately being responsible for ensuring their own security. This is that the European countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) will infer from it that they must finally assume more of the spending burden of the security alliance with the U.S. to ensure the defence of their own borders. Trump has long made it clear that he thinks European countries should spend at least 2.5% of their annual gross domestic product (GDP) on defence, with the U.S. having spent 3.6% of GDP in this way last year. Over the same period, only Greece managed this minimum 2.5% requirement (at 3.23%) with Great Britain second (at 2.33%). The longstanding de facto economic leader of the European Union of 27 countries was near the bottom of the list, at just 1.52%.

That said, the combination of a negotiated settlement ending the Russia-Ukraine War and the implicit obligation to spend at least 2.5% of GDP on defence every year might prompt a gradual fracturing in the already uneasy political cohesion of the European Union towards punishing Russia for its aggression against Ukraine. Many European economies have buckled in recent years from the effects of Covid, surging inflation caused by soaring energy prices after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and competition from China in key sectors. These elements may convince any new German government (following the recent collapse of its governing coalition) that resuming the cheap and plentiful supplies of energy from Russia upon which it built much of its economic wealth over the previous two decades is a necessary step to its financial recovery. Russia, for its part, will be more than happy to accommodate it, beginning with the extension of gas exports to Europe via Ukraine at the end of this year.

The third measure that Trump is likely to take in his first 100 days as President will be giving the nod to Israel to do whatever it wants with Iran.

It should be remembered that it was Trump’s belief that Iran was using the ‘Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’ (JCPOA, or colloquially ‘the nuclear deal’) cynically to quietly build up its nuclear weapons programme from money accrued through increased trade and investment made possible by the deal, as analysed in full in my latest book on the new global oil market order. That was why the U.S. unilaterally pulled out of the deal in May 2018. It was also Trump who said on 4 October that “Israel should hit the [Iranian] nuclear [facilities] first and worry about the rest later.” He added – in response to Biden’s flat ‘no’ on Israel striking Iran’s nuclear sites — “That’s the craziest thing I’ve ever heard. That’s the biggest risk we have. The biggest risk we have is nuclear … Soon they’re going to have nuclear weapons. And then you’re going to have problems.” Removing – or at least severely downgrading – Iran’s nuclear threat would allow the Trump Presidential Administration to reassert its authority with several major Arab states, most notably Iran’s historical nemesis in the region, Saudi Arabia. This could be done through the re-start of the relationship normalisation deals that the previous Trump government orchestrated between Arab states and Washington’s principal Middle Eastern ally Israel that began in 2020 with the UAE, as also detailed in my latest book. The resuscitation of these types of deals is something Trump has already signaled as being a key priority for his new Administration. Doing this, in the aftermath of a major Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear weapons development programme, would have the corollary benefit for Trump of derailing China’s efforts since 2018 especially to replace the U.S. as the leading superpower in the vital global oil and gas region of the Middle East. It would also enable the U.S. to resume the sort of cooperation with Saudi Arabia and OPEC that kept oil price within the ‘Trump Oil Price Range’ for virtually the entirety of his previous presidential term.